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Without norms, normative statements are impossible. At some 
point welfare economics must introduce ethical welfare 
functions from outside of economics. Which set of ends is 
relevant is decidedly not a scientific question of economics 
(Samuelson 1952, 1103). 
 
In welfare economics one is engaged in ethical counseling on the 
economic aspects of social states (Bergson 1954, 247). 
 
In short, there is no such thing as “value-free welfare economics” 
and, indeed, the phrase itself is a contradiction in terms. To say 
that something is an improvement in “welfare” is to say that it is 
desirable, and persuasive statements of this kind necessarily 
involve ethical considerations (Blaug 1978, 626). 
 
 
This article will re-examine Mark Blaug’s position on the normative 
character of Paretian welfare economics. Section one explains Blaug’s 
position and its relationship to the views of the founders of the new 
welfare economics in the 1930s and 1940s. Section two examines 
HANDS / BLAUG ON THE NORMATIVITY OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 
VOLUME 6, ISSUE 3 (SPECIAL ISSUE), WINTER 2013 2 
Blaug’s argument in more detail through the lens of his debate with 
Pieter Hennipman (Blaug 1993; Hennipman 1992, 1993): a (sometimes 
rather heated) exchange in which Hennipman argued that Paretian 
welfare economics was (or at least could be) strictly positive economic 
science, while Blaug argued it was inescapably normative. Providing an 
overall assessment of the debate will prove to be impossible, because 
the authors were often talking at cross-purposes and defining key  
terms in very different ways. However, it is still possible to better 
understand the two positions and to identify the relationship between 
the presuppositions of the two economists and their stance on the 
normativity question.  
After the examination of Blaug’s position in the first two       
sections, the last section turns to clarifying some sources of the 
miscommunication in the Hennipman-Blaug exchange as well as to 
suggest some additional arguments that Blaug might have made in      
his response to Hennipman and to other defenders of the strictly 
positive interpretation of new welfare economics. The three main    
goals of the paper are 1) to clarify Blaug’s normative reading of Paretian 
welfare economics and situate his arguments within the broader 
literature on the ethical and methodological foundations of welfare 
economics, 2) to identify some of the origins of the communication 
problems apparent in the Blaug-Hennipman debate, and 3) to try to   
add some additional arguments supporting Blaug’s interpretation that 
he himself did not provide.  
 
BLAUG ON POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE IN THE NEW WELFARE ECONOMICS 
Blaug’s argument for the normativity of welfare economics was 
presented in two of his most popular books: his history of economic 
thought textbook Economic theory in retrospect (1987 [1962]), and       
his survey of economic methodology The methodology of economics 
(1992 [1980]). His arguments were repeated and expanded in various 
places (1987 [1962]; 1990a; 1998) and he was also the author of an 
important historical paper on the first and second fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics (2007). His basic position remained     
the same in all of this follow-up literature: i) Paretian welfare economics 
is necessarily normative; ii) contra Lionel Robbins and others, its 
normativity does not prevent the legitimate use of welfare analysis       
in economic science; and yet 3) it is important to maintain “the positive-
normative distinction as far as it can be maintained” (Blaug 1998, 373). 
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Before delving into the details of Blaug’s position, it seems useful to 
review the history of the new welfare economics. Welfare economics has 
traditionally been defined as the (micro)economic theory that provides 
tools for the evaluation of various economic policies, institutional 
arrangements, and allocations of economic resources (outcomes). Since 
throughout the history of economics the most carefully analyzed 
institution for the allocation of resources has been the competitive 
market, there has always been a close connection between welfare 
economics and the idea that “in some sense perfect competition 
represented an optimal situation” (Samuelson 1947, 203).  
Focusing on mainstream post-classical views, welfare economics 
experienced two periods of relatively stable equilibria: the “old” 
hedonistic-utilitarian welfare economics of the early neoclassicals      
and turn-of-the-century British economists like Alfred Marshall and 
Arthur C. Pigou, and the “new” welfare economics associated originally 
with Vilfredo Pareto, but formalized and stabilized by economists such 
as Abram Bergson, Oscar Lange, and Paul Samuelson during the period 
1935-1955. Lionel Robbins’s influential An essay on the nature and 
significance of economic science (1935 [1932]) did not make a direct 
contribution to the new welfare economics, but his critique of the older 
approach set the stage for the new theory by arguing persuasively 
against the possibility of making purely scientific interpersonal      
utility comparisons.1 This change in welfare economics was of course 
associated with the ordinal revolution, the move from cardinal to 
ordinal utility within consumer choice theory during the 1930s.2 
One of the key organizing principles of the new welfare economics 
was of course the concept of a Pareto optimal (PO), or economically 
efficient, allocation of resources: an allocation from which it is 
impossible to make one person better off without making someone   
else worse off. Since the possibility of making one person better off 
                                                 
1 Key foundational texts for the new welfare economics include: Bergson 1938; Lange 
1942; and Samuelson 1947, chapter 8. However, the ideas were popularized in a 
number of books originally published during the immediate post-World-War-II period 
such as: Graaff 1968 [1957]; Little 2002 [1950]; and Myint 1965 [1948]. Samuelson 
provided a definitive summary statement of Bergsonian welfare economics many years 
later, see Samuelson 1981. 
2 Although the exact relationship is much more complex and tension-laden than 
generally recognized: tensions clearly exhibited in the debate surrounding the Robert 
Cooter and Peter Rappoport paper on this topic during the mid-1980s. See Cooter and 
Rappoport 1984, and 1985; Davis 1990; Hennipman 1987; Little 1985. For discussions 
of the historical and philosophical complexities of the ordinal revolution, see Hands 
2009, and 2010.  
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without making someone else worse off implies the existence of a 
potential Pareto improvement (PPI), a PO allocation is thus one from 
which there exists no PPIs. In the new welfare economics the relevant 
vehicle for the evaluation of whether an allocation is “better” or “worse” 
for a particular individual is his/her ordinal utility function (or the 
associated well-ordered preferences) from modern demand theory.    
The two main theoretical results of the new welfare economics were the 
first and second fundamental theorems which linked the concept of a 
PO allocation to the Walrasian competitive equilibrium (CE). The first 
fundamental theorem states that every CE is PO: that a CE is sufficient 
for an efficient allocation of resources. The second fundamental 
theorem states that any PO allocation of resources can be achieved by a 
combination of CE and some set of lump-sum transfers (taxes and/or 
subsidies).3  
Although the first and second fundamental theorems demonstrate 
the relationship between CE and OP allocations, they do not alone 
answer the traditional question about the socially optimal allocation of 
resources or the associated institutions or policies. The problem is     
the non-uniqueness of efficient allocations. Even in a simple two-good 
two-agent pure exchange model there are an infinite number of PO 
allocations (given by the contract curve). Yes, each could be supported 
by some CE price vector, and yes, every CE price vector is associated 
with one of these efficient allocations, but that does not alone identify 
the socially optimal allocation. For that, the new welfare economics 
employed Bergson’s idea of a social welfare function (SWF): a function 
that assigns a level of welfare (W) to each of the relevant states of the 
world based on the social/ethical values of the relevant society.4 In its 
most general form, SWF is given by: 
                                                 
3 For a detailed history, see Blaug 2007. For a detailed discussion of the philosophical 
foundations of these two theorems, see Hausman and McPherson 2006. 
4 The importance of Bergson’s contribution to the new welfare economics is captured 
nicely in a quote from Samuelson (1981, 3): 
 
As I write, the new welfare economics is just over four decades old. This subject, 
in its essentials as we know it today, was born when the 24-year-old Abram 
Bergson—then still a Harvard graduate student—wrote his classic 1938 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics article. To one like myself, who before 1938 knew all the 
relevant literature on welfare economics and just could not make coherent sense 
of it, Bergson’s work came like a flash of lightning, describable only in the words 
of the pontifical poet: 
 
Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night: 
God said, Let Newton be! and all was light. 
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W = ω(x1, x2, …, xN),          (1) 
 
where the xis are various states of the world.5 Although the most general 
form of the SWF in (1) is the conceptual starting point, most work in the 
new welfare economics was based on the more restricted case of an 
individualistic social welfare function: one that “respects” individual 
valuations. Given the standard characterization of individual ‘i’—his/her 
ordinal utility function Ui(xi)—the individualistic social welfare function 
becomes; 
 
W = w[U1(x1), U2(x2), …, UJ(xJ)] with ∂w/∂Ui > 0 for all i,   (2) 
 
where each Ui is well-behaved and exhibits neither envy nor altruism. 
This is the form of the social welfare function that has been most 
discussed in the literature over the years, in part because it corresponds 
with how most economists think about individual agents and in part 
because it captures the profession’s (individualistic) intuitions regarding 
what ought to count within welfare economics, but also because            
it facilitates the derivation of necessary conditions for social welfare 
maximization in terms of Pareto optimality: “as a criterion for a 
maximum position the condition that it should be impossible in this 
position to increase the welfare of one individual without decreasing 
that of another” (Bergson 1938, 326). Notice that such a social      
welfare function will necessarily make (ordinal) interpersonal utility 
comparisons; it is the ability to make such comparisons that allows 
maximization of the SWF to identify the social optimal (identify the 
optimal allocation among the infinite number of PO allocations along 
the contract curve). As Samuelson explained: 
 
[…] we have seen that it is not possible to deduce a unique 
equilibrium unless we have more to build upon. This is only as it 
should be, for intuition assures us that there cannot be an optimum 
position which is independent of the exact form of the W function 
[…] Without a well-defined W function, i.e., without assumptions 
concerning interpersonal comparisons of utility, it is impossible to 
decide which of these points is best. In terms of a given set of ethical 
notions which define a Welfare function the best point on the 
generalized contract locus can be determined, and only then 
(Samuelson 1947, 243-244). 
                                                 
5 I employ the compact symbolism employed in Samuelson 1977. 
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Of course it is always possible to move beyond the general 
individualistic SWF in (2) to a third level of welfare concretization, to 
obtain specific results based on the value judgments of a particular 
society or group of individuals. This could be done by specifying either 
more restrictive functional forms or explicit functions for the w(·) as 
well as each of the Ui(·)s and solving the maximum conditions for that 
particular case. For example, if one takes w(·) to be additively separable 
and takes each Ui(·) to be a cardinal indicator of each individual’s 
hedonistic utility, one would have the traditional utilitarian social utility 
function associated with Bentham and the early British neoclassicals. 
In this way, Samuelson and others argued that the new welfare 
economics provided a general framework for welfare analysis that was 
not dependent on any specific set of ethical commitments, while at     
the same time accommodating the various ethical views present in the 
previous literature as particular instantiations of the general analytical 
framework. It should be noted that this is all quite consistent with      
the general approach to economic analysis presented in Part I of 
Samuelson’s Foundations (1947): characterize the economic problem     
in terms of a constrained optimization problem, put enough additional 
structure on the relevant functions to obtain first order conditions for 
the general problem, and finally move to explicit functions or functional 
forms to get specific results for particular applications (in this case     
for particular ethical values). Also notice that when specific value 
judgments are included, they are the value judgments of the relevant 
social community or decision maker. The argument that taking the  
value judgments of the relevant community as data or background 
information is scientifically just fine—even though injecting your      
own value judgments into the analysis is not—goes back to at least   
Max Weber and was consistently endorsed by Robbins and others (see 
Mongin 2006, 276). As Bergson explained in his original paper: 
 
In general, any set of value propositions which is sufficient for the 
evaluation of all alternatives may be introduced, and for each of 
these sets of propositions there corresponds a maximum position. 
The number of sets is infinite, and in any particular case the 
selection of one of them must be determined by its compatibility 
with the values prevailing in the community the welfare of which     
is being studied. For only if the welfare principles are based       
upon prevailing values, can they be relevant to the activity of the 
community in question (Bergson 1938, 328). 
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So given all this, what was scientific/positive and what was 
normative/ethical within the new welfare economics according to its 
founders like Bergson and Samuelson? Obviously, the social welfare 
function is explicitly ethical6—its purpose is to make interpersonal 
welfare judgments—but that did not mean that welfare economics was 
not a legitimate part of economic analysis. The argument was that this is 
no different than what is regularly done in other areas of economic 
analysis such as consumer choice theory. The economist takes the 
“tastes” (the utility function) of the consumer as given and these tastes 
reflect “values”, but they are the values of the consumer and not 
necessarily the values of the economic analyst. As Samuelson put it in 
Foundations: 
 
It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to examine the 
consequences of various value judgments, whether or not they      
are shared by the theorist, just as the study of comparative ethics   
is itself a science like any other branch of anthropology. If it is 
appropriate for the economist to analyze the way Robinson Crusoe 
directs production so as to maximize his (curious) preferences,     
the economist does not thereby commit himself to those tastes or 
inquire concerning the manner in which they were or ought to have 
been formed (Samuelson 1947, 220). 
 
For Samuelson, the fact that welfare economics—at least welfare 
economics that employs a SWF—involves value judgments does not 
prevent it from being a legitimate part of economic analysis, but it   
does mean that that the results produced by welfare economics are not 
empirically “meaningful” in the positivistic sense employed throughout 
Foundations. As he says: 
 
It is only fair to point out, however, that the theorems enunciated 
under the heading of welfare economics are not meaningful 
propositions or hypotheses in the technical sense. For they represent 
the deductive implications of assumptions which are not themselves 
meaningful refutable hypotheses about reality (Samuelson 1947, 
220-221). 
 
Again, this is entirely consistent with the analytical framework        
of Foundations: the mathematical machinery facilitates economic 
                                                 
6 As Samuelson put it, the SWF “is supposed to characterize some ethical belief—that 
of a benevolent despot, or a complete egotist, or ‘all men of good will’, a misanthrope, 
a state, race, or group mind, God, etc.” (Samuelson 1947, 221). 
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analysis—deductions and theorems from various assumptions—but   
the cognitive status of the theorems so deduced, whether they are 
empirically meaningful or not, depends on the empirical content of    
the underlying assumptions: “By a meaningful theorem I mean simply    
a hypothesis about empirical data which could conceivably be refuted,  
if only under ideal conditions” (Samuelson 1947, 4). The new welfare 
economics involving a SWF is valid and useful economic analysis, 
although not strictly positive economic science under Samuelson’s 
definition of empirical science. 
It is difficult to compare Blaug’s argument that welfare economics 
necessarily involves value judgments (discussed below) with the role 
that Bergson and Samuelson assign to value judgments in the new 
welfare economics. The problem is that Blaug and the founders of      
the new welfare economics focus on different parts of the theory.       
For Bergson and Samuelson welfare economics necessarily requires 
interpersonal utility comparisons, and therefore a SWF, and that is 
where the ethics enters into the analysis. In other words, what makes     
a particular piece of economic analysis “welfare economics” is the social 
welfare function and the question of whether the new welfare 
economics involves value judgments reduces to the question of the 
cognitive status of the social welfare function itself; Bergson and 
Samuelson were relatively silent about the cognitive status of              
the various parts of economic theory involved in welfare economics 
other than (or prior to) the SWF, such as the concept of a Pareto 
optimal/efficient allocation, the contract curve, and the associated 
fundamental theorems. Implicitly it seems they considered the cognitive 
status of such concepts to be the same as that of consumer choice 
theory and the other parts of economic analysis that new welfare 
economics is associated with, but these parts of economic theory raise 
much more general methodological questions than the question of  
value judgments specific to the new welfare economics.  
This is not the case for Blaug. In fact Blaug has very little to say 
about the SWF. For Blaug, welfare economics is the use of Pareto 
optimality and the associated fundamental theorems to analyze various 
questions about economic institutions and microeconomic policy, and 
that often has nothing to do with a SWF, but rather involves the direct 
application of PO, PPI, and the fundamental theorems. After Bergson 
and Samuelson, most economists agreed that SWF-based welfare 
economics was normative and necessarily involved value judgments,  
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but for Blaug that was not the important methodological question.     
The important methodological issue for Blaug was the cognitive status 
of the concept of Pareto optimality itself, and by implication, the parts 
of welfare economics such as the first and second fundamental 
theorems that were based on Pareto optimality. This was a part of the 
new welfare economics that most mainstream economists, following 
Pareto, considered to be positive economics and devoid of any value 
judgments. As Blaug explains: 
 
Pareto asserted, in his now famous statement of the conditions of 
optimality, that perfect competition would automatically maximize 
collective ophelimity […] in the sense that no reallocation of 
resources could make anyone better off without at least making   
one person worse off. As far as he was concerned, this was a 
proposition of pure economics, which was completely independent 
of any ethical value judgments (Blaug 1992 [1980], 122). 
 
It was this aspect of Paretian welfare economics, the concept of 
efficiency and the associated fundamental theorems—“the quaint notion 
of the ‘new’ welfare economics that propositions about ‘efficiency’ are 
somehow value-free, while propositions about ‘equity’ are necessarily 
value laden” (Blaug 1978, 626)—that concerned Blaug, not the SWF that 
housed the normativity for Bergson and Samuelson.  
Blaug made a multi-pronged attack on the claim that the Paretian 
welfare economics of the first and second fundamental theorems was, 
or could reasonably be made into, strictly positive economic science. 
Perhaps his most direct argument was that the concept of Pareto 
optimality itself involved value judgments. He noted three separate 
ways in which the Paretian concept of efficiency is value-laden. 
 
[…] the concept of a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources is 
predicated on three assumptions which are undeniably judgments of 
values: (1) that every individual is the best judge of his own welfare; 
(2) that the social welfare is defined only in terms of the welfare of 
individuals; and (3) that the welfare of individuals may not be 
compared (Blaug 1978, 626). 
 
Blaug’s interpretation of statements (1) and (2) seems to be correct 
as long as one identifies a socially optimal allocation with a socially 
desirable (or, even more ethics-laden “good”) allocation. The statement 
that a more desirable allocation of resources is one with more welfare as 
judged by the relevant individuals and only the relevant individuals 
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clearly involves value judgments. The presumption that efficiency         
is (perhaps even ethically) desirable is certainly suggested by the 
profession’s traditional rhetoric—an allocation where one person cannot 
be made better off without making someone else worse off is called 
“efficient”, not “horrible” or some other term with a negative 
connotation—but as we will see in the next section, not everyone 
involved in the debate surrounding the new welfare economics would 
attach such meaning to efficiency. On the other hand, (3) might be 
considered an empirical statement—for example, if utility is a mental 
state measurable by modern neurophysiological scanning techniques 
then it might be empirically testable—but it could also be a value 
judgment, although not an ethical value judgment. As discussed below, 
Blaug himself, following Ernest Nagel, makes a distinction between 
methodological judgments and (ethical) value judgments (Blaug 1992 
[1980], 114), and (3) seems to clearly be a judgment about the 
methodological limitations of our scientific tools, not an ethical 
judgment.  
The second of Blaug’s arguments stems from his understanding of 
philosophy of science as a normative enterprise. Economists, following 
Robbins (1935 [1932]), Milton Friedman (1953), and others, have 
traditionally equated “normative” with “ethical”—equating what “ought 
to be” with what “ought to be on moral grounds”—and while ethical 
normativity is one kind of normativity, it is certainly not the only kind. 
Norms involve rules and action-guiding principles; they are prescriptive, 
but not all prescriptions prescribe that which is moral. Philosophy of 
natural science has traditionally been a normative discipline specifying 
what scientists ought to do in order to be good scientists (to find truth, 
or to save the phenomena, or to uncover the hidden causal forces,        
or what have you), so when Blaug the economic methodologist says that 
economists should make bold conjectures and subject them to severe 
empirical tests, he is making a normative claim. This understanding     
of the tight connection between scientific practice (what “is” in science) 
and methodological norms (what scientists “ought” to do) has often led 
Blaug to talk down the strict dichotomy between positive and normative 
that economists have long endorsed (if not always practiced) and this   
in turn adds another pathway for value judgments to enter into    
welfare economics.7 Since “Science as a social enterprise cannot  
                                                 
7 For a general discussion of the positive-normative dichotomy in economics, see 
Hands 2012a. 
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function without methodological judgments” (Blaug 1992 [1980], 114) 
methodological value judgments like (3) above are bound to be involved 
in even the most scientific welfare economics. Of course, this is an 
argument that is not restricted to the new welfare economics, or even 
welfare economics in general; it applies to all economic (and all other) 
science.8 
Blaug also makes several arguments for an even broader interaction 
between positive/facts and normative/values in welfare (and other) 
economics. The facts of the matter often have an important impact on 
our moral (and other) normative evaluations and thus these normative 
appraisals may be much more amenable to rational criticism and 
reasoned revision than traditionally supposed. If so, the concept of 
economic efficiency could involve value judgments, even moral value 
judgments, and yet be subject to scrutiny and revision by reason and 
evidence. As Blaug explains: 
 
We have overstated the case in suggesting that normative judgments 
are the sort of judgments that are never amenable to rational 
discussion designed to reconcile whatever differences there are 
between people. Even if Hume is right in denying that “ought” can be 
logically deduced from “is”, and of course “is” from “ought”, there  
is no denying that “oughts” are powerfully influenced by “ises” and 
that the values we hold almost always depend on a whole series of 
factual beliefs (Blaug 1992 [1980], 115). 
 
Although Blaug’s various points do not come together to produce a 
single knock-down argument for the normativity of the new welfare 
economics, taken in total they add up to a fairly serious indictment of 
the view that the new welfare economics, at least sans the SWF, is just 
one of many cognitively equivalent subfields within positive economic 
science and involves no value judgments. As Blaug summarized his 
view: 
 
The concept of Pareto optimality and the associated concept of PPIs, 
should not be confused with the theorems of positive economics.     
If this implies that economists must give up the notion that there 
are purely technical, value-free efficiency arguments for certain 
                                                 
8 As I pointed out many years ago (Hands 1984), Blaug’s appreciation of the interaction 
between methodology and the actual historical practice of science was not always 
apparent in either his methodological writings or in his work in the history of 
economic thought. See, for example, our exchange on Blaug’s interpretation of the 
Keynesian revolution: Blaug 1976, 1990a, 1991; and Hands 1990. 
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economic changes, and indeed that the very terms “efficient” and 
“inefficient” are terms of normative and not positive economics,     
so much the better: immense confusion has been sown by the 
pretense that we can pronounce “scientifically” on matters of 
“efficiency” without committing ourselves to any value judgments 
(Blaug 1992 [1980], 127). 
 
BLAUG-HENNIPMAN DEBATE ON THE  
NORMATIVITY OF NEW WELFARE ECONOMICS 
This section will discuss the Blaug versus Hennipman exchange over  
the normativity of the new welfare economics during the early 1990s. 
Although the arguments involved in that exchange will be the main 
focus, the discussion starts a few decades earlier with a paper on 
welfare economics by G. C. (Chris) Archibald published in 1959. The 
views expressed in the Archibald paper are frequently repeated            
by Hennipman—in fact Blaug refers to “the Archibald-Hennipman 
argument” (Blaug 1992 [1980], 126)—but that is not the only reason    
for examining Archibald’s paper. In addition, Archibald’s interpretation 
of the new welfare economics has a special significance because he,   
like Blaug, was attempting to formulate an interpretation of modern 
economics (including welfare economics) consistent with Karl Popper’s 
philosophy of science. This Popperian connection puts a particularly 
intriguing methodological spin on the differences between the Blaug 
view and the Archibald-Hennipman view of Paretian welfare economics. 
Archibald’s paper was a product of the LSE staff seminar in 
‘Methodology, Measurement, and Testing’ (the M2T seminar) that Richard 
Lipsey began in 1957 (De Marchi 1988). The seminar was both a   
product of, and a response to, Robbins’s interpretation of economic 
methodology. As Neil De Marchi explained in his discussion of the 
methodological impact of the seminar: 
 
This group—really a palace guard, since many had been students 
under Robbins and owed their elevation to his influence—sought to 
recast economic knowledge in falsifiable form and proclaim their 
independence from the dogma, in which they had been schooled, 
that quantification is not only difficult but unnecessary. 
These may sound like sweeping aspirations, but the goal was 
actually very specific: to replace Robbins’s Nature and Significance 
of Economic Science as the dominant source of methodological   
ideas for British economists and to argue for the notion that        
they alone cannot be a sufficient basis for policy conclusions. 
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Expressed positively, economics should become a quantified science 
(De Marchi 1988, 141). 
 
Archibald in particular—who was greatly influenced by Samuelson’s 
Foundations—sought to use Samuelson’s analytical framework as the 
basis for a purely scientific version of the new welfare economics that 
could restore the field to its respected place within positive economic 
science after being dethroned by Robbins’s arguments against 
interpersonal utility comparisons. Robbins made a convincing argument 
that the old welfare economics had no place in economic science, but if 
the new welfare economics was necessarily normative—as Samuelson 
and Bergson had argued for welfare economics involving the SWF—then 
the new welfare economics would be scientifically no better than        
the old. On the other hand, if Pareto optimality/efficiency and the 
fundamental theorems did not involve value judgments, then the new 
welfare economics (at least sans SWF) would have a rightful place along 
with the rest of positive economic science. 
Archibald’s argument was wide-ranging, but I will focus on two 
interrelated points that also show up later in Hennipman’s papers. The 
first is that although economists often talk about welfare economics    
as if it tells us—or policy makers—what we “ought to do” for the social 
good, there is nothing about the theory itself that requires, or even 
suggests, that interpretation. As Archibald put it, his argument  
 
will not satisfy those who, because they demand of welfare 
economics that it ‘tell them what to do’, understand by welfare 
economics a discipline necessarily founded upon value judgments, 
and therefore assert simply that my use of the term is not theirs 
(Archibald 1959, 316).  
 
For Archibald, and moving to his second point, welfare economics is 
really no different than other areas of economics such as consumer 
choice theory or the theory of the firm. Following Robbins’s definition  
of economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative 
uses” (Robbins 1935 [1932], 16) the economist starts with given wants 
and then “asks how their progress towards their objectives is 
conditioned by the scarcity of means” (Robbins 1935 [1932], 24). 
Welfare economics is just an extension of this inquiry into the question 
of economic efficiency. A PPI allocation is one in which at least one 
person could be made better off without making someone else worse off 
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and that is an inefficient way of satisfying given wants with the available 
means. If the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
demonstrates that every CE is PO, then it shows that competitive 
markets are an efficient way to satisfy given wants with scarce means. 
Why should such a theorem have any less cognitive significance than a 
well-established area within economic science such as consumer choice 
theory? As Archibald explains, given Robbins’s definition, it should not: 
 
[…] it is hard to understand why welfare economics should be set 
apart. If we enquire into the efficiency of alternative arrangements 
for satisfying given wants, why is a judgment about these wants       
a necessary foundation for the theorems we discover? […] The 
sensible procedure in welfare economics appears quite simply to be 
this: we take, as an interesting criterion, the choice-system of the 
individuals, and ask how different arrangements alter the available 
choices. That we call the choice-criterion an index of welfare is no 
value judgment or prescriptive implication (Archibald 1959, 317). 
 
As he summarized the argument:9 
 
The enquiries we label “welfare economics” are positive enquiries 
into the effects on certain indexes of alternative arrangements      
[…] No value judgments need precede the enquiry; […] and the 
conclusions have no prescriptive force. The theorems of welfare 
economics are thus theorems in positive economics; they are 
concerned with the relationship between given ends and available 
means (Archibald 1959, 320). 
 
Hennipman repeats both of Archibald’s arguments, but also adds 
some additional criticisms of—and a new twist on—normative 
interpretations such as Blaug’s. Like Archibald, he admits that 
economists in fact use welfare economics in normative ways: 
 
The characterization of welfare economics as normative has 
undoubtedly a considerable descriptive validity. As Blaug points out, 
                                                 
9 One aspect of Archibald’s argument that I will not discuss because it would carry us 
too far a field is his use of a version of revealed preference theory to characterize 
preference, choice, and welfare. This topic has recently received a lot of attention,      
in part because of its methodological use by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), and raises     
a number of methodological issues well beyond the task at hand. For criticism of 
Archibald’s particular use of revealed preference, see Mongin 2006, 272-275; and      
for more general discussions of the relationship between contemporary revealed 
preference theory and welfare economics, see Hands 2012b; and Hausman 2008, 2012. 
For a discussion of the relationship between Blaug’s methodology and Gul and 
Pesendorfer’s position, see Hands 2013. 
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economists do in fact judge how practical problems concerning 
allocation should be solved (Hennipman 1992, 434). 
 
Similarly, he explains that the “neutral” interpretation of concepts 
like economic efficiency is just a particular version of an instrumental 
approach to finding efficient means for achieving given ends. The choice 
between the “normativist” and the “neutralist” reading of Pareto 
optimality is “a free methodological choice” (Hennipman 1992, 434).10  
 
The neutral approach takes allocative efficiency as a given end in the 
sense that it may be a desired objective, without itself endorsing   
the Paretian value judgments […]  
In consequence, the positive theory does not aim at offering 
categorical policy prescriptions, it only gives recommendations    
that are conditional on the acceptance of the postulated goal […] 
Propositions of this kind are based on economic judgments […] 
which, from the policy point of view, are known as instrumental 
judgments […] 
This simple scheme definitely refutes the view that welfare 
economics is necessarily normative because it ‘deals with policy’ 
(Hennipman 1992, 429-430). 
 
Hennipman also responds to Blaug’s comments on the three 
assumptions that make Pareto optimality a normative concept 
(discussed in the previous section) and his remarks are quite similar    
to those I made above;  
 
Blaug’s description of the first and second assumptions makes sense 
if it is understood as tacitly presupposing that Pareto optimality is 
an ethical concept and a favoured policy objective […] however, the 
third assumption is not ‘undeniably’ a value judgment (Hennipman 
1992, 416).  
 
In addition he criticizes Blaug’s presupposition that anything that 
brings about an increase in welfare is necessarily desirable, by arguing 
that as a factual matter welfare in economics has traditionally meant 
just what people prefer (solely the subjective judgment of the 
individual) and has not been considered desirable in any higher, 
universal, or objective sense (Hennipman 1992, 420-421). 
                                                 
10 Hennipman also follows Archibald in using the term “essentialism” for the view   
that welfare economics must necessarily be normative—a pretty damning criticism of a 
Popperian.  
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Perhaps Hennipman’s most original criticism is a new twist on 
Blaug’s normativity argument. Hennipman criticizes Blaug’s view that 
Pareto optimality is normative because it favors and privileges efficiency 
over any other standard one might choose to employ in the evaluation 
of various resource allocations. It becomes not only a normative 
standard about what ought to be done, but the normative standard.  
 
The real danger of such an effect would arguably arise if, following 
Blaug, economists were to attach an ethical meaning to efficiency, 
acclaiming it unreservedly as desirable. This would be most 
injudicious because while one may regard efficiency in many cases 
as meritorious, it is not always true that efficiency is “more 
desirable” than inefficiency. In general its moral value obviously 
depends on the ends, means and ways of action. One may very well 
prefer an inefficient to an efficient Gestapo (Hennipman 1992, 422). 
 
Later in the same paper Hennipman offers yet another twist by 
making the case that since welfare economists must, on his reading      
of Blaug, know what is ethically good—they must have a “distinctive 
capability”—and the only “remotely feasible justification” “stems 
directly from the intrinsic desirability of Pareto optimality” (Hennipman 
1992, 435). He then spends five pages criticizing the “normative 
pretensions” of this “ethical desirability postulate”. 
Finally, in his reply (1993) to Blaug’s (1993) comment on his     
paper, Hennipman challenges Blaug’s notion of methodological        
value judgments. He accuses Blaug of “semantic novelty” by using,     
and confusing, two different notions of the normative: ethical and 
methodological. He argues that Blaug first “defines, in accordance with 
normal usage, normative as ‘involving ethical propositions’” (Hennipman 
1993, 291), but then changes to “ought statements” and “appraising 
judgments” of a methodological sort. For Hennipman this is “side-
tracking the debate onto an irrelevant line” which “evades the problem 
the whole controversy is about, i.e., the ethical commitment of welfare 
economics” (Hennipman 1993, 292). Hennipman ends his reply with      
a “dismal epilogue” where he closes with some rather harsh remarks 
about the “thankless task” of getting Blaug to “see the light” 
(Hennipman 1993, 294). Needless to say, Hennipman’s remarks did    
not find any common ground with Blaug’s position, in fact they seemed 
to push the two economists farther apart.  
Unfortunately, Blaug’s comment on Hennipman’s 1992 paper was 
only two and a half pages long and seemed to muddy the waters still 
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more. For example, regarding the question of the dual meaning             
of normative—ethical and methodological—Blaug makes both of the 
following statements in his brief comment: (i) “‘Normative’ economics, 
however, involves ethical propositions about what is good or bad which 
can never be in the nature of the case decisively resolved by factual 
evidence” (Blaug 1993, 125), and (ii) “But methodological judgments are 
just as normative as value judgments, that is, facts and more facts can 
never persuade us to abandon them” (Blaug 1993, 128). I believe             
I understand what Blaug meant in both of these sentences, but it takes 
some serious reading between the lines. By “normative economics”       
in (i), Blaug probably meant “what most economists have traditionally 
considered normative economics to be”, and not “any economics that 
has a normative component must be ethical”, but as I say, it is not 
entirely clear. It seems that both Hennipman and Blaug are talking at 
cross purposes and never find any semantic common ground on which 
they could clearly agree or disagree. One can of course debate whether 
“the new welfare economics is normative in the sense of necessarily 
presupposing ethical value judgments” or whether “the new welfare 
economics is strictly positive in the sense of not presupposing any 
normative judgments of any type”. Either one of these is an interesting 
and important debate, and one in which many economists would come 
down on both sides, but an exchange—particularly a heated exchange—
where neither author is clear about which question is being debated is 
not only one in which nothing will be resolved, it is one in which readers 
will not even be clear on the positions of the two authors.  
Similar remarks can be made for Blaug’s discussion of the three 
value-laden assumptions of Pareto optimality. Regarding (1), that “every 
individual is the best judge of his or her best interests” (consumer 
sovereignty),11 Blaug says: 
 
The first of these three postulates is clearly a value judgment in the 
sense that no observations about consumer behaviour could ever 
force us to abandon the belief that consumers themselves know best 
what is good for them. Since value judgments belong to normative 
economics Paretian welfare economics is necessarily normative.      
                                                 
11 Although Blaug and Hennipman agree on very little, they both do seem to believe 
that “every individual is the best judge of his or her best interest” is equivalent to 
“consumer sovereignty”, which is ironic, since it is not obvious the two terms mean  
the same thing. The latter seems to mean that the consumer is free to choose, and the 
former seems to mean that what they choose is always in their best interest; these 
appear to be entirely different things.  
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In one sense, this completes, my case and no more need to be said to 
vindicate my position (Blaug 1993, 125). 
 
Again, this only seems to confuse the issues. If it is possible to get a 
consensus on what the expression “good for them” means—say 
increases the survival of the person’s genes—then it may in fact be 
possible to determine whether a particular individual is consuming that 
which is good for them or not. On the other hand, if one is assuming the 
good in “good for them” is morally good, but based on subjective 
personal ethical values, then the problem is methodological; we observe 
what they consume but we do not have access to their mental states  
that would allow us to determine whether what they consume matches 
up with what they think is ethically good. Finally, if one is assuming       
a universal ethical good in “good for them”, then the statement is an 
ethically normative statement in the sense in which Blaug seems to be 
using the term “normative economics” a few sentences above this quote. 
So depending on one’s definition of the relevant terms the proposition 
could be positive, methodologically normative, or ethically normative.   
It is just not clear.  
Similar remarks could be made for his comments on the other      
two assumptions (2) and (3), but I will not go through the details.       
The bottom line is that neither Blaug nor Hennipman offered an entirely 
persuasive defense of their position, and perhaps worse, actually seem 
to have made the issues, and their positions on the issues, even less 
clear. If one goes back before this exchange and reads Archibald (1959) 
and Blaug (1978) one is clear about the two positions; one may agree 
with one rather than the other, or parts of each, or even support 
something different than either one, but one understands what the 
authors are saying about the new welfare economics. After the 
Hennipman-Blaug debate, that no longer seems to be the case.  
 
WHAT BLAUG MIGHT HAVE SAID TO HENNIPMAN (AND ARCHIBALD) 
In this section, I will try to identify the roots of some of the 
communication problems in the Blaug-Hennipman debate and also       
to offer a few arguments that Blaug might have made in response to 
Hennipman (and in some cases Archibald), but for whatever reason did 
not make. There are five comments in total, although the first two 
overlap to some extent.  
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1. The term “normative” is the source of much confusion in this 
exchange and in other discussions of the foundations of welfare 
economics. Similar remarks can be made about “value judgments”, but 
since the case for “normative” is a bit clearer, I will focus on that. 
Economists have traditionally equated “normative” with “ethical”. As a 
result of the influence of experimental and behavioral economics, this 
may currently be changing, but the traditional interpretation of the 
distinction between “positive” and “normative” in economics has been 
that positive is about “what is” and normative is about what “ought      
to be in order to be moral”. As Hennipman noted, in the normal usage of 
economists ‘normative’ means “involving ethical propositions” (1993, 
291). There is a long, as yet unwritten, story about how this came to be 
within the economics profession, but it is in fact the case, and it leads  
to numerous confusions.12 The source of the problem, as noted briefly 
above, is that outside of economics, that which is “normative” is 
necessarily norm-guided, but the norms need not be moral norms.   
They could be norms of rationality, or epistemology, or many other 
things, rather than morality. Blaug, with his knowledge of normative 
philosophy of natural science in general, and his commitment to 
Popperian scientific norms in particular, recognized that welfare 
economics could be normative without being ethical, and used this fact 
in his argument about methodological value judgments. But this use of 
normative is quite alien to most economists and Hennipman’s remarks 
clearly reflect this. That said, Blaug does not help matters much because 
he never clearly explains that ethically normative is just one particular 
instantiation of normative, and often slips into the standard economist 
usage himself. Some definitional groundwork would have been very 
useful and it would have decreased the amount of talking at cross-
purposes. Blaug’s arguments about the role of methodological norms in 
strictly positive science are sound, but they are never entirely clear 
because of the blinders imposed by the traditional way the term 
normative has been used in economics. 
2. Following on the previous point, if Blaug had clarified the 
diversity of ways in which the term ‘normative’ is used outside of 
economics, he would have opened the door to an additional argument 
regarding how a type of (non-ethical) normativity enters into welfare 
                                                 
12 Although, for an excellent beginning on this historical project, see Heukelom 2014. 
He provides a detailed historical discussion of the differences between economists and 
experimental psychologists over how ‘normative’ is interpreted.  
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economics. Both Archibald and Hennipman argued that talking about an 
efficient allocation in welfare economics was just like talking about    
the optimal bundle in consumer choice theory. Rational choice theory in 
general and consumer choice theory in particular is just an application 
of instrumental rationality—selecting the most efficient means for 
achieving any given ends. Their argument was that the new welfare 
economics was no less scientific, and thus no more normative, than    
the ordinal utility theory. But why should we think that ordinal utility is 
itself devoid of normative considerations. Does ordinal utility theory tell 
us “what is” by empirically discovering the underlying utility functions 
that cause choice behavior? Perhaps there are some specific 
approaches—revealed preference or imputed valuation—that try to do 
this, but this is not standard textbook economics. The preferences and 
utility functions that drive most exercises in choice theory are not given 
by nature or by the best available evidence—they are posited—and the 
theoretical exercise simply draws out the deductive implications of that 
posit. Most of the “given” wants of economics are posited wants rather 
than found wants, and they are not just any-old posited wants. They are 
posited rational wants. They are wants embodied in well-behaved, 
complete and transitive, preferences with sufficient structure to support 
the existence of an ordinal utility function defined over the entire choice 
space. So where do these posited restrictions come form? They involve 
rationality. The posited rational wants are motivated by our normative 
value judgments about what one “ought to do in order to be rational”. 
There is a reason that many elementary textbooks call the transitivity 
assumption “rationality”—it originates in our normative intuitions about 
the essential nature of rationality. This makes the rational choice 
foundations of welfare economics, and thus welfare economics, laden 
with normativity.13 They are norms of rationality not morality, and the 
presence of such normative influence does not prevent the resulting 
economic theory from being scientifically adequate, but they are    
norms nonetheless. This is not going to win over those—perhaps       
like Hennipman—who only want to debate the question of whether the 
new welfare economics is ethically normative, but it seems to be a nice 
way to make Blaug’s point that the new welfare economics is not strictly 
positive in the way that Archibald, Hennipman, and others have argued. 
                                                 
13 A related argument about rationality and normativity in choice theory is given in 
Hausman and McPherson 2006. 
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3. One simple thing that would clarify the discussion would be to 
decide what “welfare economics” is, before entering into a debate   
about whether it is normative or positive. It seems that the         
different economists discussed above have quite different definitions. 
For Archibald and Hennipman it seems that welfare economics is about 
labeling various resource allocations as efficient or inefficient. The 
theory says “X is an efficient allocation” (in the world or in a model)   
and that is the end of it. Nothing else seems to follow from the fact that 
an allocation is so labeled. It does not necessarily say that it is better 
than other allocations, or that the government or anyone else should try 
to bring X about. Of course they consistently note that adding extra 
normative judgments about efficient allocations is always permissible, 
but they are not necessary implications of the analysis—and it is still 
“welfare economics” even if no such additional normative structure is 
added. Although it is not entirely clear how Bergson or Samuelson 
would view the act of labeling efficient allocations, it is clear that just 
doing so would not be welfare economics; for them welfare economics 
involves the interpersonal utility comparisons provided by a SWF.  
Unlike Archibald and Hennipman, Blaug obviously defines welfare 
economics in the traditional way as the microeconomic theory that 
provides tools for the evaluation of various economic policies, 
institutional arrangements, and the allocation of economic resources. 
And although Blaug’s definition is more consistent with professional 
practice, it is not necessary to decide which definition is more 
descriptively accurate. The issue is simply that before one is involved in 
a debate over whether the new welfare economics is necessarily 
normative it would be useful to agree on what welfare economics is     
(in addition to, as noted above, what normative means). 
4. Blaug should have responded to Hennipman’s claim that by 
making Pareto optimality (ethically) normative, Blaug committed all 
economists to this, and only this, notion of the good or what the society 
ought to do. This is, well, silly. Pointing out that Pareto optimality 
involves ethical values only draws attention to the fact that ethical 
values are involved, and then once recognized, the door is open to 
consideration of other possible ethical values.14 Blaug is not saying    
that Pareto optimality entails the universal notion of what is good; he is 
                                                 
14 I would note this is the general approach of Hausman and McPherson (2006). 
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simply saying that it entails some notion of the good (basically that the 
satisfaction of individual preferences is good), and by implication other 
ethical judgments might be considered. This is a very weak argument by 
Hennipman and Blaug should have pointed it out in his comment. 
5. Finally, I close by returning to the founders of the new welfare 
economics: Bergson and Samuelson. It seems fairly easy to reconcile 
Blaug’s view with the views of these founders. After all, they too    
define welfare economics in terms of the evaluation of policies and 
institutions, they just do not consider the mere mention of Pareto 
optimality to be sufficient to make a particular piece of economic 
analysis into welfare economics. A particular piece of theorizing 
becomes welfare economics when one adds a SWF: a value judgment 
that such allocations are a good thing and can be used to defend 
policies on that basis. Although Bergson and Samuelson are silent about 
the question of non-ethical normative judgments such as rationality in 
their writings on the new welfare economics, one could certainly add 
such non-ethical normativity to their general framework. One could 
argue, consistent with the case that Blaug seems to want to make,     
that welfare economics is not strictly positive because the choice theory 
on which welfare economics rests is laden with normative notions of 
rationality. This would take care of Blaug’s problem about “the quaint 
notion of the ‘new’ welfare economics that propositions about 
‘efficiency’ are somehow value-free, while propositions about ‘equity’ are 
necessarily value laden” (Blaug 1978, 626), without committing the basic 
technical machinery of welfare economics or the fundamental theorems 
to the charge of being ethically normative. The theorems, as in the view 
of Archibald and Hennipman, would be methodologically just like 
consumer choice theory, it is just that it too involves normative—though 
not ethical—considerations about what one ought to do in order to be 
rational. Then when one moves beyond the background theoretical 
machinery to real welfare economics—that which judges institutions 
and suggests policy—here the ethical considerations would be explicit 
(and necessary). The new welfare economics—defined as welfare 
economics has traditionally been defined—would in fact (necessarily) 
involve ethical value judgments as argued by Bergson, Samuelson, and 
Blaug. This seems to answer Blaug’s main concerns and make his most 
important points, and it does so without contradicting anything in the 
stated positions of either Bergson or Samuelson.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has tried to clarify the various points of view in the         
long-standing debate over the normative character of the new welfare 
economics: in general and with particular reference to Blaug’s debate 
with Hennipman. The original interpretation of Bergson and Samuelson, 
as well as the strictly positive interpretation of Archibald and 
Hennipman, were examined in detail. The exchange between Blaug     
and Hennipman was also discussed in detail, but a conclusive 
assessment was not reached because there was such a lack of agreement 
about the starting point, purpose of the debate, and even the relevant 
definitions, that both authors ended up often talking past, rather      
than seriously addressing, the arguments of the other economist. 
Finally, in section three, five additional points were made to help explain 
some of the sources of confusion in the debate and also to offer a few 
arguments that Blaug might have made in his exchange with Hennipman 
and discussion of Archibald. 
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